In re M.A.C.

Hope Cumpian appeals from a judgment terminating her parent-child relationship with M.A.C. The Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services initiated the suit while M.A.C. was a newborn, because M.A.C. tested positive for cocaine at birth. As the appointed temporary sole managing conservator of M.A.C., the Department maintained custody of the child throughout this litigation. We shall address Cumpian’s three points of error in reverse order.

Point of error three contends, “The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to allow a no-cost physical examination of the child by a medical expert of the appellant’s choosing.” Cumpian filed a motion to permit Dr. Marie Ferris, a board certified pediatrician, to examine M.A.C., for the purpose of assessing the existence and severity of the infant’s alleged fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal cocaine syndrome. Cumpian asked that Dr. Ferris be treated as her consulting expert. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e). The Department argues the motion was not presented to the trial court in a timely manner because it was filed within thirty days of the date set for trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.3(1)(A). The motion was filed the first time in December, some two months before the case actually went to trial. The trial court denied the motion but advised Cumpian that he would reconsider his ruling if the need for an expert became apparent during trial. Cumpian re-urged her motion after the trial was reset at the Department’s request. A trial resetting has the effect of nullifying the discovery deadline. J.G. v. Murray, 915 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. App.- -Corpus Christi 1995, orig. proceeding). Thus, the motion was not untimely under Rule 190.3(1)(A).