OPINION
A jury found Boris Dawson guilty of the murder of Francois Dean and set his punishment at life imprisonment. At the punishment phase of the trial, the State sought to introduce a statement Dawson allegedly made to the police that concerned not the murder for which Dawson was then being tried, but another offense to which Dawson had been linked. Dawson filed a motion to suppress the statement on the basis that it was made involuntarily. The trial court held a hearing, ruled the statement admissible, and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. Dawson contends on appeal that the statement was inadmissible.
The determination of whether a statement is voluntary is a mixed question of law and fact, i.e., an application of law to a fact question. Garcia v. State, 15 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, � 6 (Vernon 1979). As a general rule, we afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts concerning the making of the statement so long as the record supports them, especially when the trial court’s fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We should afford the same deference to a trial court’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. We may review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not fall within this category. See id. Because ordinarily the determination of whether a statement is voluntary turns almost entirely on the evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we will afford almost total deference to the trial court’s resolution of this type of mixed question of law and fact. See Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Garcia v. State, 15 S.W.3d at 535; Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
