Dillard, Presiding Judge. The State has charged Andrew James Wright with one count of homicide by vehicle based on driving under the influence of drugs to the extent that he was a lesssafe driver (“DUI less safe”) and one count of homicide by vehicle based on reckless driving. In this interlocutory appeal, Wright contends the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to exclude the testimony of his proffered expert witness under OCGA § 24-7-702 (“Rule 702″). For the following reasons, we reverse. The record shows that on August 19, 2020, while driving a tractor trailer, Wright struck a vehicle operated by Susan Chambers—which tragically resulted in her death. Wright’s blood tested positive for various prescription drugs,[1] and he was charged as set forth above. In November 2022, Wright filed a notice of his intent to call as a defense witness an expert in pharmacology and toxicology. Almost eighteen months later, in April 2024, the State filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Wright’s proposed expert. At the subsequent hearing, Wright’s proposed expert, a professor of clinical and administrative pharmacology at the University of Georgia College of Pharmacy, testified. The professor has worked at the College of Pharmacy since 1981; he has a doctorate in pharmacology and toxicology; he teaches and lectures on pharmacology and toxicology, among other subjects; and he oversees a program within the College of Pharmacy for students who have potential drug or alcohol issues. As defined by the professor, pharmacology is “the study of how drugs produce their effects[,]” including not only the methods by which drugs produce their effects and side effects, but also how “ drugs are absorbed, metabolized, excreted and distributed in the body.” Toxicology is similar to pharmacology but focuses on “the toxic or adverse events of drugs and chemicals.” Prior to this case, the professor had testified as an expert in both civil and criminal cases in several states, and he was accepted as an expert in pharmacology and toxicology for purposes of the hearing in Wright’s case. In addition to teaching and overseeing the student-impairment program, the professor has also done animal studies on controlled substances, including cocaine. In reaching his opinion in this case, the professor reviewed the results of Wright’s blood test, which was taken approximately four hours after the collision, as well as Wright’s prescription records.[2] The professor explained that Wright tested positive for Tramadol, a non-opiate pain reliever; amphetamine; Gabapentin; Imipramine, an anti-depressant; and Desipramine, which “is actually a breakdown of metabolite from” Imipramine. Wright had prescriptions for Tramadol; amphetamine, in the form of Adderall (which is used to treat ADHD); Gabapentin; and Imipramine. Wright’s blood test showed that the amount of Tramadol present was at the low end of the therapeutic range and the amount of amphetamine was actually below the therapeutic range. The other drugs were not quantified. When asked by defense counsel what effect, if any, the professor would expect these drugs to have on Wright at the time of the blood draw or the collision, the professor explained that because Wright had been taking these drugs for months or years, he would expect Wright to be “able to function.”[3] The professor went on to state that, over many years, he has observed students taking Adderall, Tramadol, and Gabapentin, and at “very low, low therapeutic levels” (such as those found in Wright’s blood), the drugs should not have “affect[ed] his ability to operate a machine.” Moreover, many people taking these drugs operate vehicles and otherwise function normally; and the professor testified that if Wright had any issues with driving, his clinician would have noted it. On cross-examination, the professor explained that while he had not undertaken any human studies regarding the specific drugs found in Wright’s blood and their impact on driving, he was familiar with the literature in this area, which he reviewed as a part of his academic teaching. Notably, the professor explained that this opinion was based on the specialized knowledge of his areas of expertise, including pharmacological principles. Following that hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion to exclude the testimony of the professor. Wright thereafter filed an application for interlocutory review to this Court, which we granted.[4] This appeal follows. Before we turn to Wright’s claim of error, some historical context and general review may be helpful. Effective July 1, 2022, the General Assembly repealed the former statute which specifically governed the admission of expert testimony in criminal cases,[5] and amended Rule 702 such that it “now governs the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal as well as civil cases.”[6] And with this amendment, the General Assembly “extended to criminal cases the federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony” articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.[7] and its progeny.[8] The amended version of Rule 702 (b) provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if: (1) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (4) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.[9] Because Georgia’s Rule 702 is modeled after Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “we look to the decisions of federal appellate courts, especially the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit” for guidance.[10] In determining whether an expert’s testimony is admissible under Daubert, the trial court acts as “a gatekeeper, assessing both the witness’ qualifications to testify in a particular area of expertise and the relevancy and reliability of the proffered testimony.”[11] The purpose of Daubert‘s gate-keeping requirement is to “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”[12] And reliability requires “a casespecific inquiry.”[13] Importantly, in making its assessment, the trial court “may not exclude an otherwise sufficient expert opinion simply because it believes that the opinion is not—in its view—particularly strong or persuasive.”[14] Rather, the weight to be given to “admissible expert testimony is a matter for the jury.”[15] Ultimately, courts must remain cautious not to “improperly use the admissibility criteria to supplant”[16] the sacrosanct right to a jury trial[17] because “[v]igorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”[18] When applying Rule 702, the trial court has “broad discretion” to accept or reject “the qualifications of an expert witness, and we review a trial court’s ruling on both the qualification of an expert and the admissibility of that expert’s testimony for an abuse of discretion.”[19] Finally, as the party seeking to rely on the proffered expert, Wright bore the burden of establishing that the professor’s testimony was reliable within the meaning of Rule 702.[20] With the foregoing guiding principles in mind, we will now address the merits of Wright’s particular claim of error. Specifically, he maintains the trial court improperly considered the persuasiveness or weight of the proffered expert testimony and, in doing so, failed to act as a “gatekeeper” and abused its discretion. We agree. In making its ruling, the trial court concluded that the professor “otherwise” qualified as an expert in toxicology and pharmacology based on his training and experience. Even so, the trial court determined that the professor’s proposed testimony “would not be sufficiently reliable so as to help the trier of fact” as required under Rule 702 (b) (1) because the professor had “not engaged in any studies, field tests or direct evaluations concerning the effects of drugs on the ability of a human being to operate a motor vehicle safely.” And because the professor could not testify to the “direct result . . . of drugs on a human being’s ability to operate a motor vehicle safely,” the court found that he had not reliably applied principles and methods to the facts of this case as required under Rule 702 (b) (4). In this case, Wright is charged with, inter alia, homicide by vehicle based on DUI less safe.[21] In order to convict Wright of this charge, the State is required to prove that he drove a vehicle while “[u]nder the influence of any drug to the extent that it [was] less safe” for him to drive.[22] As a result, contrary to the trial court’s finding, the professor’s specialized knowledge of pharmacology and toxicology would help the trier of fact determine an important fact at issue: whether Wright was a less-safe driver as a result of his prescription medications.[23] And while the trial court specifically found the professor’s testimony would not be helpful because it lacked reliability (in that the professor had not engaged in any human studies, field testing, or direct observation of drivers), the factual basis of an expert opinion “goes to the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility, and it is up to the opposing party to examine the factual basis for the opinion in crossexamination.”[24] Moreover, while there is “inevitably some overlap among the basic requirements—qualification, reliability, and helpfulness—they remain distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.”[25] Here, the trial court appears to have conflated helpfulness and reliability.[26] As to whether the professor reliably applied pharmacological principles and methods to the facts of this case within the meaning of Rule 702 (b) (4), the trial court found the professor had not reliably applied these principles because he could not testify directly as to the impact of drugs on a human’s ability to drive. In reaching his opinion, the professor reviewed the results of Wright’s blood test, which included the levels of various medications present, as well as Wright’s prescription history. And the professor testified that, in his opinion, based on the evidence he considered, as well as his knowledge of pharmacology (including his review of the literature, and his personal experience with people taking the same drugs Wright was taking), Wright would have been able to function normally, including driving. Ultimately, the trial court “may not exclude an otherwise sufficient expert opinion simply because it believes that the opinion is not—in its view—particularly strong or persuasive.”[27] Instead, the weight to be given to “admissible expert testimony is a matter for the jury.”[28] But here, the trial court excluded the professor’s proposed testimony because it found that the testimony was not particularly strong or persuasive.[29] In doing so, the court abused its discretion.[30] For all these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment reversed. Mercier, C. J., and Land, J., concur.
