Papers considered: NYSCEF documents 5 through 55 DECISION AND ORDER This action stems from a dispute involving a condominium building (the building) at 10 Shore Road in Glenwood Landing, New York, and two of its residents. Plaintiff Glen Harbor Holdings, LLC, is the sponsor of the building; plaintiff Glen Harbor Development Co., LLC, is the building’s developer; and plaintiff Board of Managers of the Residences at Glen Harbor Condominium is the building’s governing body. Defendants, David Wiener and Carol Wiener, own a residential unit in the building. Plaintiffs complain that after defendants purchased their unit in August 2022, David began criticizing plaintiffs’ management and financial decisions. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint, inter alia, that David and his wife “challenged board/management decisions and protocols,” “told the Condominium staff that he is going to get rid of management”; “tried to fracture the staff and turn them against their manager, board and sponsors”; “harasse[d] the employees for personal information on residents, management, and the developer”; has told employees that they are underpaid; has told staff “that the current property management services are not needed”; “hang[ed] out at the front desk every night”; “walk[ed] around with a camera photographing and recording employees”; asked workers questions, criticized their work, and took photographs; discussed employee issues with other residents; told other residents of “his twisted and false narrative,” including “detail[s] regarding the false budget and the building being in disrepair”; threatened reporting plaintiffs to the New York State Attorney General’s Office; “talk[ed] negatively about the manager in the lobby”; emailed other building residents; and “undermine[d] the manager’s authority by challenging her decisions and protocols and openly share[d] this with staff members.” Plaintiffs interposed claims for private nuisance, public nuisance, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, injunctive relief, defamation, defamation per se, slander, and for legal fees. Instead of answering, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (a) (7), and (g); and for costs, legal fees, and compensatory and punitive damages under Civil Rights Law §70-a (1) (a). Defendants do not ask for any particular amount of fees and damages, but request that the Court accept submissions regarding same. In their opposition papers, plaintiffs have withdrawn their claims for defamation, defamation per se, slander, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, leaving only the claims for private nuisance, public nuisance, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by Civil Rights Law §76-a. That statute governs SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) suits, which are “brought to intimidate or silence a person who has spoken out about a matter of public interest” (Reeves v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 232 AD3d 10, 12). Section 76-a defines “action involving public petition and participation” as a claim premised upon either “any communication in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest,” or “any other lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest, or in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition.” Moreover, the statute provides that “‘[p]ublic interest’ shall be construed broadly, and shall mean any subject other than a purely private matter,” and ‘”[c]ommunication shall mean any statement, claim, allegation in a proceeding, decision, protest, writing, argument, contention or other expression.” The protections afforded by section 76-a are broad, and “[m]atters of public concern include matters of political, social, or other concern to the community, even those that do not affect the general population” (Aristocrat Plastic Surgery P.C. v. Silva, 206 AD3d 26, 29-30 [quotation marks and citations omitted]). CPLR 3211 (g) creates an accelerated procedure for dismissing a SLAPP suit. It states that when “the moving party has demonstrated that the action, claim, cross claim or counterclaim subject to the motion is an action involving public petition and participation” under Civil Rights Law §76-a, a motion to dismiss “shall be granted unless the party responding to the motion demonstrates that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification[,] or reversal of existing law.” “The substantial basis standard is intended to mean such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” (Reeves, 232 AD3d at 22 [quotation marks and citations omitted]). It “has been equated with the ordinary summary judgment standard, in that each seeks to determine whether there are triable issues of material fact,” meaning that “the CPLR 3211 (g) motion is analogous to an accelerated summary judgment motion” (id. at 23, 24). Section 3211 (g) is so protective of New York’s free speech rights that it flipped the burden of proof on the ultimate dispositive merits; it provided that the party moving for dismissal need not establish a dispositive procedural or substantive defense on the merits of the action…but rather, need only establish that the true nature of the action is one within the scope of anti-SLAPP. The actual burden of proof as to the action’s meritoriousness is thereupon shifted in the context of anti-SLAPP immediately to the plaintiff, which is unique (VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v. Sproule, 224 AD3d 78, 83; see M.V. v. J.T., __ Misc 3d __, 2024 NY Slip Op 24260). Dismissal of this action is required by Civil Rights Law §76-a and CPLR 3211 (g). Despite plaintiffs’ colorful characterization of defendants’ conduct, even a cursory review of the complaint reveals that the true nature of the complaint is based on defendants’ disagreements with the plaintiffs’ financial and management decisions. The thrust of the complaint is plaintiffs’ gripes about defendant David Wiener telling plaintiffs and building residents about building-related issues, including, but not limited to, claimed building defects and alleged financial and management improprieties. Accordingly, defendants have shown that the true nature of this action is plaintiffs’ dislike of defendants’ public participation and petition such that section 76-a is applicable (see Brown v. 287 Les JV LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 32756 [U] [holding that a communication from one condominium unit owner to other owners was a matter of public interest under section 76-a]; see also 215 W. 84th St Owner LLC v. Bailey, 217 AD3d 488). In opposition, plaintiffs failed to show that their claims have a substantial basis in law. For the same reasons, so much of defendants’ motion as seeks legal fees and damages under Civil Rights Law §70-a is granted, and an in-person hearing regarding same shall be held on March 13, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. Thus, defendants’ motion is granted in its entirety. This shall constitute the decision and order of the Court.
